The Religious Field between Globalization and Regionalization: Comparative Perspectives

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Religion and religiosity have great significance for global politics. If one believes Samuel Huntington, we are actually dealing with a clash of cultures based on religion (Huntington 1996). Huntington's division of the world identifies the realm of Christianity as encompassing Western Europe and North America, Catholic South America, Orthodox Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, while he characterizes the Arab world, North Africa, and Central and South Asia as being Muslim. This geopolitical paradigm shapes not only some of the social-scientific discussion but also much of politics in both the East and West. However, the religious situation is anything but homogenous in individual regions and countries:

- Alongside culturally influential majority religions, we frequently see religious variety. This is partly due to historical reasons and partly due to religiosity without membership in a religious community, immigration, the new visibility of small religious communities, the emergence of new religions, and the diffusion of the religious beliefs and practices of foreign cultures via the media.
- The so-called world religions—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and others—are not monolithic. For instance, how can it make sense to speak of the "Christian Western world" while claiming to offer more than an ideological program for a dominant European culture? Since its inception, Christianity has always developed outside of Europe as well, and it is increasingly doing so today. This trend entails the establishment of various milieus and currents in the dominant religious communities. For example, David Barrett, one of the editors of the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, estimates that there are currently nearly 34,000 Christian denominations and currents worldwide (cf. Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001). Just as there is no single Christianity nor are Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions homogenous entities.
- It is unclear what effects different religions exert apart from influencing the culture in specifically religious terms. The characteristics of religiosity are

quite varied in different social and cultural contexts, which is a point that older variants of the secularization thesis usually fail to address. For example, advanced modernization and high religiosity are by no means mutually exclusive. In order to arrive at nuanced conclusions, one must consider how the major religious traditions are embedded in regional and (particularly) country-specific cultural contexts.

Comparisons between countries and denominations are thus imperative for arriving at nuanced conclusions about religion and religiosity on a global scale (cf. Beyer 2006 and Casanova 2008). Following the first steps in this direction taken by the "World Value Survey" (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2004) and other studies, the Religion Monitor 2008 now presents new data, which—due to its theoretical model of religiosity (cf. Huber 2003, 2008a)—are also more specific and differentiated.

In this chapter, we discuss the Religion Monitor's global and regional findings. In doing so, we consider contents that are related to six core dimensions of religion in addition to the concept of centrality. Table 1 depicts the "location" of these concepts in the taxonomy of the Religion Monitor. This approach brings the global religious field into view with a broad scope and a high degree of differentiation. At the same time, it demonstrates paradigmatically the analytical potential of the Religion Monitor's underlying theoretical model.

Table 1: Interpreted concepts in the taxonomy of the Religion Monitor

		Contents		
		General		Specific (Themes, approaches, attitudes styles)
		Foundational semantics		
		Theistic	Pantheistic	
Core dimensions	**Intellect**			Religious reflectivity
	Ideology (belief)			Pluralism; fundamentalism
	Public practice			Religious affiliation
	Private practice			Interreligious practice
	Experience			Positive and negative religious feelings
	Consequences	Relevance of religious commandments to daily life		Relevance of religiosity to work, politics, and particular situations in life
Centrality		Centrality scale		Religious self-concept

In particular, we ask which structures and dynamics of the global religious field can be identified by going beyond block thinking. All the same, the following analysis can only scratch the surface and definitely needs to be developed in more depth. In addition, the survey material from 21 selected countries does not yet permit us to draw comprehensive conclusions, and the database must be significantly expanded for global analyses. In any case, we hope this chapter will stimulate further transnational research on religion on a global scale, following the path we have taken here.

Methodological considerations

Comparative methods assume two things. First, frames of references must be established from which one can secondly derive *tertia comparationis*. A point of comparison as a *tertium* is necessarily characterized by sufficient abstraction to allow the comparison of heterogeneous empirical data and thereby bring differences and similarities to the surface. However, if the comparative method is to be more than pure artifice that merely imposes foreign elements on empirical data—that is, if the *tertia comparationis* is meant to correspond with the material—then certain aspects must be unilaterally emphasized and abstracted from the empirical data. To this end, Max Weber developed the method of constructing ideal types (cf. Krech 2006), which we will use as our foundation in the following.

As our frames of references, we have chosen perspectives from sociology, psychology, and the history of religion. The interrelationship of these three perspectives arises from the relations among socialization and individualization processes, as well as religious semantics. We assume that the three perspectives overlap in an individual's religious construct system. Religious construct systems thus function as "resonance bodies," so to speak, for semantics in the public sphere that are grounded in the history of religion. Since the ability of religious semantics to resonate socially increases along with their centrality, the concept of centrality plays a key role in our analysis.

As *tertia comparationis* we consider both exogenous and endogenous factors to explain religious structures and dynamics. This method goes beyond the framework of conventional social-scientific research in which individual religious contents such as faith in God or prayer are explained solely through exogenous factors such as a country's level of modernization or an individual's position in the social structure. Considering endogenous factors offers the chance to expose religiosity's inner logic.

In our comparative discussion of the findings of the Religion Monitor 2008, we use two analytical strategies. For one, we use regression analysis models (OLS methods). Such models are especially suited to depicting the general structures and dynamics of the global religious field. For another, we interpret the mean scores of individual countries and groups of countries. In doing this, we rely on graphic representations of the distributions of the mean scores for individual countries and groups of countries. This descriptive strategy also allows us to look at regional distinctions.

In the regression analysis models (OLS methods—see Tables 7 through 10), the scope of the explanatory factors for the religious field is successively expanded in three blocks (see Table 2):

- Model 1 (M 1): In the first model, only exogenous factors are taken into consideration.
  - Age, gender, and education: These indicators depict an individual's position in the social structure.
  - Human Development Index (HDI): This indicator represents a country's degree of modernization. It includes not just the gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant in terms of purchasing price parity, but also life expectancy and the population's educational attainment.
  - Gini coefficient: This depicts a country's distribution of income. We use it as an indicator of the degree of social inequality in a country.
- Model 2 (M 2): In addition to the exogenous factors, the second model includes the centrality of religiosity as (what we, at least, presume to be) the most important endogenous factor. By calculating these two models successively, we create an opportunity to determine how much the exogenous variables and the endogenous variable of centrality each contribute to explaining the variance of the dependent variables.
- Model 3 (M3): Additional endogenous variables besides centrality are included in Model 3. This allows us to determine the relative weight of centrality in comparison to other endogenous variables. From the plethora of endogenous factors than can influence the structures and dynamics of an individual's religiosity and the religious field, we have chosen the following:
  - Diversity index: This represents the extent of the religious field's differentiation within a country. It is calculated by determining the number of members/adherents of each religious community in a country as a percentage of total population. These percentages are then squared and added together (cf. Krech 2008: 37).

- Religious affiliation: This variable is based on respondents' self-attribution to the religious communities surveyed. The group of respondents unaffiliated with any denomination serves as a dummy variable.

Table 2: Design of the three regression analysis models

Independent variables			**Regression analysis models (OLS)**		
Factors in the religious field		**Indicators**	**Model 1** (M 1)	**Model 2** (M 2)	**Model 3** (M 3)
Exogenous-factors	Position in the social structure (individual)	Age	X	X	X
		Gender	X	X	X
		Educational level	X	X	X
	Degree of modernization (country)	HDI	X	X	X
	Social inequality (country)	Gini coefficient	X	X	X
Endogenous-factors	Centrality (individual)	C-index		X	X
	Religious diversity (country)	Diversity index			X
	Religious affiliation (individual and religious community)	Christianity			X
		Judaism			X
		Islam			X
		Hinduism			X
		Buddhism			X

In interpreting the results of regression analysis, one must bear in mind that the database is subject to several limitations. First, the number of countries is too small to permit valid conclusions to be drawn for the global religious situation. Second, key factors in the global religious field are distributed unevenly in the country samples and partially confounded (see Table 3). For example, most of the respondents belonging to a non-Christian religious community were surveyed in countries with a low level of modernization. In addition, the findings for Jewish, Orthodox Christian, and Hindu religiosity each come almost entirely from a single country, which implies further confounding. For both of these reasons, the findings can only hint at tendencies whose validity definitely needs to be reassessed on the basis of larger and more proportionate country samples. We therefore highlight our descriptive findings in our interpretation of the Religion Monitor 2008 data.

The question of how exogenous and endogenous variables relate to each other is a central principle in structuring our regression analysis models. Here, the relationship between the degree of modernization (HDI) and centrality is particularly interesting. Since both of these benchmarks represent fundamental categories in the sociology and psychology of religion, they also play a special role in our descriptive comparisons.

The descriptive comparisons (Figures 2 -13) depend to a considerable degree on how we place the countries in our graphs. The sequence we chose is based on the following criteria (Table 3):

- Degree of modernization: Highly modernized countries (HDI >.80) are placed to the left and to the far right of the graphs. Since the level of modernization expresses an important perspective in the sociology of religion, these countries are highlighted in the graphs with gray bars.
- Religious affiliation: In terms of religious affiliation we consider not just the major religious traditions such as Hinduism and Christianity but also superordinate classification systems (e.g., Abrahamic religions versus Eastern religions) and subordinate differentiations (e.g., denominations within Christianity). These classifications express similarities in the construction of the content of religiosity.
- Geographic proximity: Since many of the countries shaped by Christianity are located in Europe, we have also grouped these countries together. The justification for this classification in terms of content is the fact that these countries have a long shared history, which has resulted in numerous interdependencies.
- Centrality of religiosity: The category of centrality is reflected in the graphs in two ways. First, the countries historically shaped by Protestant, Catholic, or Islamic traditions are arranged from left to right according to their average score for centrality. In addition, the country averages for the concepts under comparison are not only presented in their aggregate but also differentiated according to three levels of centrality. These three levels (non-religious, religious, and highly religious) represent qualitatively distinct psychological dynamics in religious experience and behavior (see Huber 2009a: 21). In this way, the psychological category of centrality becomes the second dominant principle (together with the degree of modernization) in structuring the descriptive analysis.

Like other methods of statistical inference, regression analysis models only highlight the numerical scores of a response scale. The semantics of the response

Table 3: Classification criteria for the 21 countries

ISR	GBR	DEU	CHE	RUS	FRA	AUT	ESP	POL	ITA	AUS	USA	BRA	GTM	NGA	TUR	MAR	IDN	IND	THA	KOR
HDI > .80													HDI < .80							> .80
Abrahamic religions																		Eastern religions		AR
J	Christianity														Islam			H	B	C
	European countries																			
	Pr.			Orth.	Cath.					Pr.			Cath.							
	cent.				cent.					cent.			cent.		cent.					

HDI = Human Development Index; AR = Abrahamic religion; J = Judaism; H = Hinduism; B = Buddhism; C = Christianity; Orth. = Orthodox Christian churches; Pr. = Protestant churches; Cath. = Catholic churches; cent. = according to centrality.

categories are barely relevant and only begin to carry weight in descriptive statistics. In descriptive analysis, the semantics of the response categories provide information on how or how strongly an attribute is present in an individual's psychic system and in a society.

With intensity scales (Table 4), the first two response levels indicate that a religious content is barely present in an individual's life horizon or in social discourse. As a result, it cannot become psychologically relevant or capable of resonating sociologically. By contrast, the semantics of response categories four ("very often"/"often") and five ("very much so"/"quite a bit) express that an attribute is clearly present in an individual's life horizon. Consequently, it is highly relevant psychologically for that individual's religious experience and behavior. The capacity of that content of religiosity to resonate socially is correspondingly high. The middle response category represents the transitional area between absence and clear presence. Responses at this level indicate that a religious content is present in an individual's life horizon but that it remains largely in the background.

The interpretation of agreement scales (Table 5), which are used for the concepts of "religious pluralism" and "religious fundamentalism," follows a somewhat different logic. The scales are bipolar in construction; they provide information about approving or disapproving attitudes toward an attitude object. The advantage of this is that it can represent different orientations in experience and behavior. Its disadvantage is that their intensity is measured with less nuance. The transition area can be interpreted as indifference toward the attribute under study.

To simplify the interpretation of mean scores, the figures below emphasize the three-tiered hermeneutics of the intensity and agreement scales with differ-

Table 4: Hermeneutics of intensity scales

	Score	Semantics		Hermeneutics
		Frequency	Importance	
Categories of a five-point intensity scale	5 4	Very often Often	Very quite	Clear presence
	3	Occasionally	Moderately	Transition area: background presence
	2 1	Rarely Never	Not very much Not at all	Marginal or no presence

Table 5: Hermeneutics of agreement scales

	Score	Semantics	Hermeneutics
Categories of a five-point agreement scale	5 4	Totally agree Tend to agree	Approving orientation
	3	Have no definite opinion (never bothered)	Transition area: indifference
	2 1	Tend to disagree Totally disagree	Disapproving orientation

ent highlighting for each numeric range (Figure 1). Scores of 2.5 and 3.5 serve as the threshold values. They reflect the mathematical rules for averaging.

Figures 2 through 13 depict each country's mean scores for the religious contents under comparison. Figures 5 through 13 show both the mean for the total population (as a dashed line) and the means for each of the three levels of cen-

Figure 1: Illustration of the hermeneutics of the mean scores in Figures 2, 3 and 5 through 13



trality for each country (as solid lines of varying thickness). To highlight contrasts with the typical profile of the "religious" group, its mean is calculated only from those scores that fall in the middle range of 2.5 to 3.5. Respondents with centrality scores in the transition areas (2.1 to 2.5 and 3.5 to 4.0) as well as the non-religious group (1.0 to 2.0) and the highly religious group (4.0 to 5.0) are thus not represented in the graphs of the levels of centrality. However, they are included in calculating each country's overall mean score, as well as in the regression analyses.

Findings and interpretations

For our discussion of the findings of the Religion Monitor 2008 (see Table 1), we have categorized the religious variables under comparison according to four thematic areas. This brings into view additional comparisons that make sense thematically.

- In the first section, we discuss the centrality scale in the context of two other measures of the individual relevance of religiosity: religious self-concept and the relevance of religious commandments to daily life. Since this discussion draws out the specific potential of the category of centrality, it is fundamental to the subsequent thematic areas.
- The second section revolves around concepts that are primarily relevant to interreligious relationships and contacts: religious reflexivity, religious pluralism, and religious fundamentalism.
- The third overarching theme has to do with the consequences of religiosity for areas of everyday life. We have singled out three specific areas from the plethora of possibilities: work and occupations, politics and exceptional situations.
- Finally, we discuss religious emotions in relation to their positive or negative psychological valences—a theme that is usually neglected in sociological studies of religion.

Individual relevance of religiosity

The Religion Monitor assesses the individual relevance of religiosity not only with the centrality scale but also with single-item measures of the relevance of religious commandments to daily life and the strength of an individual's religious self-concept. High intercorrelations between these two measures can be

expected since they share an overarching theoretical concept. Table 6 confirms this assumption.

These three measures represent different ways of gaining access to the individual relevance of religiosity. The centrality scale is based on a representative cross-section of the intensity of religious experience and behavior with respect to five core dimensions of the religious field. In this way, the index is a broad-based measure of the presence of religious semantics in an individual. Complementary to this, the question about the relevance of religious commandments to daily life directs our focus to the sixth core dimension, which suggests how strongly religiosity permeates daily life. While the first two measures indirectly assess the individual importance of religiosity, the religious self-concept indicator (Rel. self) asks directly about this. This indicator thus brings to the fore religious identity and the dimension of religious ideology.

As a result of these different approaches, the intercorrelations between the three measures are not perfect. We also see differences among their means (Table 6), the largest of which is between the centrality scale and religious self-concept. There are two possible reasons for this: First, the centrality scale rests on a much broader base—the five core dimensions—than does the religious self-concept, which in terms of content belongs to the ideological dimension. The significantly higher mean for the centrality scale can thus be attributed to religious components in the other four core dimensions that are "overlooked" in the religious self-concept. Second, a person's religious self-concept relies heavily on the social representation and standardization of the term "religiosity." This can lead to strong fluctuations, depending on norms that are specific to countries and groups (see Figure 2).

Table 6: Mean scores and intercorrelations for indicators of the relevance of religiosity for the individual

	N	*M*	Intercorrelations		
			C-scale	Comm.	RS concept
Centrality (C-scale)	20,293	3.4	–	.67	.73
Commandments in daily life (Comm.)	20,724	3.2	.67	–	.61
Religious Self-concept (Rel. self)	20,827	3.0	.73	.61	–

Figure 2 shows the trend line of the countries' mean scores for the three general measures of the individual relevance of religiosity. In most countries, these measures are reflected in their global ranking. The mean can be interpreted as indicating the average religiosity of a country's population. Religiosity is seen to

Figure 2: Mean scores for the relevance of religiosity for the individual, by country



be weakest in France and Russia, which is not surprising given the fact that atheism and agnosticism have enjoyed very wide-ranging political influence in both countries for many years. These movements are actors in the religious field and pursue particular goals in religious policy. This finding thus speaks in favor of a strong endogenous religious dynamic.

Very high centrality scores can be seen in countries with disparate historical religious traditions (Christian: United States, Brazil, Guatemala; Muslim: Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia; Hindu: India; Muslim and Christian: Nigeria). At the same time, the biggest differences between centrality and religious self-concept appear in these groups of countries (United States, Brazil, Guatemala, Morocco and Indonesia). This finding indicates that the validity of single-item measures of general religiosity declines as centrality increases. This applies to predominantly Christian and Muslim countries alike. Consequently, single-item measures of the relevance of religiosity to individuals should be interpreted cautiously, especially in global studies.

Figure 3 shows each country's mean score for religious self-concept and for the relevance of religious commandments to daily life as a function of the three levels of centrality. In order to permit reliable assessments, this and subsequent figures omit the mean scores for groups whose sample size is too small ($N = 2$ through 22). This is the case for the non-religious group in the countries from Brazil through India. This also applies to the religious group in Nigeria, which reflects that country's extraordinarily high degree of religiosity.

Depicting the three levels of centrality separately introduces psychological structures and dynamics into the analysis of the global religious field. The idea

Figure 3: Mean scores for religious self-concept (RS) and for the relevance of religious commandments to daily life (CD), by country



behind this is that differences in how religious contents are psychologically anchored—as expressed in the three levels of centrality—exert a formative influence on religious experience and behavior.

The two means for the group of highly religious respondents are in the upper range of the scale for all countries. Independent of their historical religious tradition, the general level of religiosity and their country's degree of modernization, highly religious individuals have a strong religious identity and are strongly guided by religious commandments in their daily lives. This suggests that there is a strong psychological dynamic in high religiosity.

Apart from a few exceptions, the means for the religious and non-religious groups show similarly minor country- and culture-specific fluctuations, much like the means for the highly religious group. This underscores the formative influence of religiosity's being psychologically anchored in the individual. The findings for Italy and Thailand represent exceptions, where the non-religious group, in particular, deviates strongly from the general trend. One explanation for this might be that the culture of daily life is especially strongly permeated by religiosity in both countries. Understanding this would require comparative studies on the social presence of Catholicism in Italy and Buddhism in Thailand, both historically and today.

Another interesting individual finding is the Israeli results on the relevance of religious commandments to daily life. Apart from Nigeria (which can be seen

as a special case regarding nearly all religious contents), the relevance of religious commandments to daily life is strongest among the highly religious group in Israel. This high score is consistent with Orthodox Jewish tradition, in which daily life has historically been highly saturated with religious commandments. At the same time, scores for the religious group are comparatively low. This indicates dissociation from orthodox interpretations of Jewish religiosity. Overall, this leads to a strong polarization of the religious field in Israel.

Table 7 shows regression analysis results for the three measures of the individual relevance of religiosity. As mentioned previously in the methodology section, these findings should be interpreted cautiously because the number of coun-

Table 7: Regression analysis models for the individual relevance of religiosity

	Dependent variables								
	Centrality			Religious self-concept			Relevance of religious commandments to daily life		
Model	Adjusted R^2								
M 1	.23			.16			.13		
M 2				.54 (ΔR^2 = .38)			.45 (ΔR^2 = .31)		
M 3				.56 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.46 (ΔR^2 = .01)		
Independent variables	Standardized beta coefficient								
	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3
Age	.13			.14	.05	.04	.17	.09	.09
Gender	.11			.11	.03	.03	.09	.03	.03
Education	*.01*			*–.01*	–.01	–.01	*.01*	*.01*	*.01*
HDI	–.28			–.29	–.09	–.07	–.23	–.05	–.02
Gini coefficient	.28			.17	–.03	*–.01*	.19	*.01*	.02
Centrality					.71	.63		.64	.60
Diversity						*.01*			.02
Christianity						.21			.13
Judaism						.05			.03
Islam						.13			.14
Hinduism						.11			.04
Buddhism						.09			.09

Note: non-significant coefficients ($p > .05$) are italicized

tries is too small and some variables are confounded. These findings merely represent tendencies whose validity needs to be tested on the basis of representative samples for each country.

In the first model, the individual relevance of religiosity is attributed entirely to exogenous variables. Its predictive power is substantially higher for centrality, where it explains 23 percent of the variance, than it is for religious self-concept (16 %) or the relevance of religious commandments to daily life (13 %). On the one hand, these differences reflect content-related differences in operational access to the individual relevance of religiosity. On the other hand, the reason that significantly more variance is explained for the centrality scale may be its greater reliability and ability to be generalized. The regression analysis results thus also argue for the empirical potential of the centrality scale.

The beta weights of the three dependent variables are very similar in the first model. The sole exception is the Gini coefficient, which is significantly higher when in comes to explaining the centrality scale. This indicates that the other two indicators can cause the influence of social inequality on the individual relevance of religiosity to be underestimated.

Since Model 2 and Model 3 define the centrality scale as a predictor, they are calculated only for religious self-concept and the relevance of religious commandments to daily life. When endogenous predictors are included, the explained variance increases several-fold, as is to be expected. In particular, these models provide evidence that among the endogenous variables, centrality is the dominant predictor of the intensity of religious self-concept (beta = .63) and the relevance of religious commandments to daily life (beta = .60). By contrast, the weights are much lower for religious diversity and religious affiliation.

Only in predicting the intensity of religious self-concept does affiliation with a Christian confession play a substantial role (beta = .21) along with centrality. Since this effect—which is conspicuous when compared to the other religious communities—can only be seen for religious self-concept and not for the relevance of religious commandments to daily life, it is likely not related to the individual relevance of religiosity on a general level, but is specific to trying to access it via religious identity. This indicates confounding of this indicator with Christian religiosity. For this reason, it should only be used with caution in comparative studies of religion.

In summary, the Religion Monitor findings all argue in favor of the centrality scale yielding a more valid picture of the individual relevance of religiosity than do single-item measures. Since it captures general religiosity in great empirical breadth, it is additionally suited to estimating the proportions of religious

and highly religious persons in a country (Figure 4). It must be emphasized here that the size of the estimated proportions depends on the threshold values used to subdivide the Centrality Index into multiple levels. Since these threshold values are not objectively fixed but can instead be set differently depending on one's cognitive interests, the proportions of religious and highly religious persons are subject to a certain degree of variability. A discussion of various threshold values for the centrality scale can be found in Huber (2003: 257–264).

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the empirical classification of an individual as "religious" or "highly religious" obeys a probabilistic logic. The goal is not to make an ontic statement about a person but merely to maximize the probability that the theoretically defined attributes actually apply to an individual classified as religious or highly religious. The more successful this measuremenstrategy, the greater the contrast will be between the religious and the highly religious groups with respect to the theoretically defined attributes. On this basis, the theoretical postulates about both groups can then be empirically tested. In this sense, the Religion Monitor 2008 data provide evidence that, when compared to religious persons, highly religious individuals have a more differentiated cognitive representation of religious contents and that their general experience and behavior are much more strongly determined by these contents (see Huber 2009a: 26).

Figure 4: Religious and highly religious individuals in the 21 countries of the Religion Monitor



At the beginning of the methodology section, we emphasized that individual religious construct systems function as "resonance bodies," so to speak, for semantics grounded in the history of religion. One can thus extrapolate from a country's mean centrality scale score (see Figure 2) to the average capacity of religious contents to resonate in society. The higher a country's mean score, the greater the resonance capacity and consequently, also the "volume" of religious semantics in that country. Additional information can be gained through a differentiated breakdown of the religious and highly religious groups.

Religious semantics may resonate with religious individuals but they do not play a central role in their lives. Religious discourses thus tend to have the character of background music for them. Nonetheless, this can still serve as the basis for mobilizing the religious group politically—even if only in defense of a culture that is shaped by religion in particular ways. In contrast, religious semantics play a central role for highly religious individuals; their perceptions, actions, and emotions are very often religiously defined. In a sense, religious contents are a "leading tone" in their experience and behavior. There is thus an increased probability that members of this group will relate strongly to religious contents in social discourses and can be mobilized in this way.

From the proportions comprised by the religious and highly religious groups, we can draw inferences about how strongly religious contents may resonate in society (e.g., religious and highly religious groups) and about the potential for active involvement in politics on the basis of religion (e.g., highly religious). Different patterns of this can be seen in Figure 4.

At this point, we will address only the example of Thailand, which is characterized by an unusual distribution of non-religious, religious, and highly religious respondents. On the one hand, only 4 percent of Thais are classified as "non-religious" in terms of the centrality scale. Non-religiosity or distance from religion is therefore not a socially relevant attitude in Thailand. On the other hand, the group of highly religious respondents—at 10 percent—is also relatively small in Thailand. The potential for active religious involvement in politics is correspondingly low. In contrast to the two extreme groups, 85 percent of Thais can be described as "religious." Thanks to this distribution, the country has a highly stable religious culture that avoids polarization. The uniqueness of this finding suggests that Thai religious culture has a strong internal dynamic. The question of whether this is a typical pattern for Buddhist religious cultures could be examined through comparative studies on Thailand's neighboring countries.

Reflexivity, pluralism and fundamentalism

In the second section, we discuss three concepts that are especially relevant for interreligious relationships and contacts. Table 8 gives an overview of the results of our regression analysis models. We interpret our findings individually for religious reflexivity, religious pluralism (attitude and practice), and religious fundamentalism.

Table 8: Regression analysis models for religious reflexivity, religious pluralism and religious fundamentalism

	Dependent variables											
	Religious reflexivity			Religious pluralism (attitude)			Religious pluralism (practice)			Religious fundamentalism		
Model	**Adjusted R^2**											
M 1	.07			.01			.02			.33		
M 2	.30 (ΔR^2 = .23)			.02 (ΔR^2 = .01)			.04 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.48 (ΔR^2 = .15)		
M 3	.32 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.04 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.06 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.51 (ΔR^2 = .03)		
Independent variables	**Standardized beta coefficient**											
	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3
Age	.05	–.03	–.04	.05	.03	.03	.03	*.01*	*–.00*	.07	.02	.03
Gender	.07	*.01*	*.01*	.06	.05	.04	*.01*	*–.00*	*–.00*	*–.01*	–.04	–.03
Education	.08	.07	.07	.04	.04	.04	–.02	–.02	–.03	–.08	–.09	–.08
HDI	–.16	*.01*	*–.02*	–.09	–.05	.05	–.13	–.09	–.05	–.40	–.33	–.26
Gini coefficient	.14	–.02	*–.01*	–.04	–.07	–.03	*.01*	–.03	*.01*	.22	.08	.09
Centrality		.56	.57		.12	.09		.15	.15		.44	.41
Diversity			.10			*.01*			.03			–.03
Christianity			*.01*			.13			.03			.10
Judaism			–.04			*–.02*			.03			.08
Islam			–.07			.15			–.04			.27
Hinduism			.03			.14			.15			.03
Buddhism			*.01*			.16			*.02*			.04

Note: non-significant coefficients ($p > .05$) are italicized

Religious reflexivity

Religious reflexivity can be conceived of as a religious style. One of its characteristics is that an individual critically scrutinizes his or her religiosity and examines whether it is internally consistent. The concept of religious reflexivity belongs to the intellectual dimension and, for that reason, it is not necessarily bound to particular ideological positions. For example, a reflective religious style is theoretically compatible with both agnostic and fundamentalist religious attitudes. Empirical evidence for its compatibility with a fundamentalist construction of religiosity can be found in Huber (2009b: 659).

Figure 5 shows the overall mean scores (dashed line) and the group means for each country as a function of the three levels of centrality (solid lines). From the trend of the overall means, we can see that reflexivity stays in the middle of the scale in nearly every country. This means that religious reflexivity is not a dominant attribute of the global religious field. Only in Nigeria does the mean score reach the upper range of the scale. However, since Nigerians answered nearly every question on religiosity in the upper range of the scale, this finding is more an expression of a general "say-yes" tendency on questions of religiosity and not really evidence of an especially highly developed culture of religious reflexivity.

A second exception is the result for Russia, which is clearly located in the lower range of the scale. This may be explained by the political and ideological fight the Soviet Union waged over many decades against any form of religiosity. This environment not only resulted in a major decline in religious experience

Figure 5: Mean scores for religious reflexivity, by country



and behavior; it may have also contributed to a sort of religious illiteracy. In particular, under these conditions, it was nearly impossible for a culture of sophisticated reflection on religious issues to emerge.

The trend lines for the means of the three levels of centrality run mostly parallel. They do not vary significantly either in relation to the countries' level of modernization or according to religious affiliation. This already indicates that the centrality of religiosity is the most important factor influencing religious reflexivity. However, even among highly religious respondents, reflexivity is not a dominant attribute of their religiosity. From the positive correlation between centrality and religious reflexivity that is observable in all countries, we can conclude that in the global religious field, the application of critical faculties to religion is not a barrier to religious experience and behavior. On the contrary, religious reflexivity tends to favor strong religiosity.

When one compares the three regression analysis models, the first thing to stand out is that exogenous factors explain only 7 percent of the variance. Among the exogenous factors, education has a positive influence on reflexivity, as expected. This effect remains even when the endogenous factors are considered. The specific weight of educational level is also revealed by a cross-comparison with other religious contents. Next to religious fundamentalism, religious reflexivity is the content that is most strongly influenced by educational level.

As Model 2 and Model 3 show, endogenous factors explain three times more variance than exogenous factors do. Centrality plays the most prominent role and religious diversity is the next-most-important endogenous factor. This finding is consistent with the theoretical expectation that encountering other religions will encourage individuals to reflect on their own religiosity. Finally, in contrast to the other religious communities, Hinduism is the only religion that exerts a positive (albeit weak) effect on the degree of religious reflexivity. This is consistent with the great internal diversity that distinguishes Hindu religious culture.

Religious pluralism—attitudes and practice

We understand religious pluralism primarily as an attitude characterized by openness and tolerance toward different religious traditions and, for this reason, we assign pluralism to the ideological dimension. We also understand religious pluralism as including a practice distinguished by integrating religious teachings and rituals from a variety of traditions. In relation to this meaning, other authors also speak of bricolage, or patchwork religiosity.

One can distinguish between a strong and a weak form of religious pluralism. In its strong form, it is grounded in the assumption that all religious traditions are equal in status as a matter of principle. In its weakened form, however, it lacks any such foundation. The Religion Monitor operationalizes religious pluralism in its weaker form, and it does so for both attitude and practice (see Huber 2009a: 28).

When interpreting our findings on religious pluralism (and later, on religious fundamentalism), one must keep in mind that the response categories for these indicators are constructed symmetrically; they express disagreement, agreement, or indifference (see Table 5 and Figure 1).

In all the countries, the attitude toward religious pluralism is approving (see the dashed line in Figure 6). In this respect, religious pluralism can be characterized as a global religious consensus. The relatively minor differences in the means for the three levels of centrality also weigh in favor of this interpretation. Centrality is evidently not a factor that distinguishes a pluralistic attitude. Closer inspection of the trend of the mean scores for the highly religious group shows the lowest levels of approval for a pluralistic perspective in Israel, Russia, the United States, Morocco, and South Korea. Since these countries represent different historical religious traditions and different levels of modernization, monocausal approaches are not suitable for explaining this. The highest scores are found in France, Austria, India, and Thailand. This finding also argues against monocausal explanations.

Figure 6: Mean scores for attitudes toward religious pluralism, by country



The most noticeable thing about the regression analysis models is that they explain only a very small portion of the variance in attitudes toward religious pluralism. In light of the lopsided distribution, method bias—and, specifically, a ceiling effect—could be partially responsible for this. However, in light of the global consensus expressed in the responses, this finding is also theoretically plausible. The predictive power of the exogenous variables is especially weak. It is worth noting that the beta weight for HDI changes to a positive value after controlling for the endogenous variables in Model 3. This finding indicates that modernity is a supporting factor for a pluralistic attitude. Centrality, too, is a weak predictor in the regression analysis models, which confirms our observations on the trend of the means for the three levels of centrality.

The strongest factor is affiliation with a religious community. Except for Judaism, all the religions surveyed exert a positive influence on a pluralistic attitude toward religion. The finding that affiliation with a religious community plays a more important role than centrality does suggests that for a pluralistic attitude, having a religious position of any sort is more important than its intensity. Since this applies to different religious communities in the same way, the content of one's religious position is also of secondary importance.

How does religious pluralism look in practice? As Figure 7 shows, the gaps between the countries' means for the three levels of centrality are about as small as those for attitudes toward religious pluralism. In addition, the lines for the religious and highly religious groups overlap numerous times. Centrality is obvi-

Figure 7: Mean scores for pluralistic religious practice, by country



ously not a strong distinguishing factor in regard to pluralistic religious practice, either. The main difference is that, in this case, the mean scores are significantly lower. In terms of content, this generally expresses an indifferent or slightly disapproving attitude. This finding suggests that the global consensus favoring religious pluralism primarily expresses a basic tolerance toward and appreciation for other religions. However, this does not imply any strong tendency toward syncretistic religious practice.

India occupies a special position here. Pluralistic religious practice is rated very positively in this country, which is influenced by Hinduism. Religious and highly religious respondents agree widely on this point. We can therefore speak of a strong religious consensus that is rooted in India's culture. Thus, even in terms of practice, Hinduism is a religious culture with a strong disposition toward combining elements drawn from different religious currents.

As was the case with pluralistic religious attitudes, the regression analysis models explain only a small portion of the variance for pluralistic religious practice. Since the nearly normal distribution in this instance means that method bias cannot be held responsible, this finding reinforces the thesis of the existence of a global consensus on religious pluralism. Here again, as was true for attitudes, exogenous variables have the weakest predictive power. This consistent finding implies that religious pluralism is largely independent of a country's sociodemographic factors and its level of modernization.

Compared to a pluralistic religious attitude, centrality carries more weight in pluralistic religious practice. This is probably because as centrality increases, so does overall religious activity. Affiliation with Hinduism exerts a similarly strong influence. Hinduism's special position on this question is underscored by the obvious difference between its beta weights and those of other religious communities. In fact, it is the only major religious community that clearly favors pluralistic religious practice.

Finally, from a theoretical perspective religious diversity is a factor that encourages reliance on other teachings. This assumption is consistent with a significant positive beta weight.

Religious fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is an enigmatic concept. It is not only applied to others but also used as a self-description, and it appears on the levels of political, religious and academic discourses. The Religion Monitor defines fundamentalism as a

"holistic" religious attitude characterized mainly by exclusive attachment to a particular religious orientation (see Huber 2009a: 29). From this perspective, concepts such as cognitive rigidity, intellectual dogmatism, and a political propensity toward violence—which are sometimes included in notions of fundamentalism—do not appear as necessary attributes of a fundamentalist religious attitude. No fundamentalism scores are available for Thailand because several of the scale's items could not be integrated into the survey. For this reason, Thailand's position in Figure 8 is left empty.

When compared with those for reflexivity and pluralism, the trend line for the countries' mean scores for religious fundamentalism display a new pattern. Indeed, mean scores are significantly higher especially for those countries that are less modernized as measured by the HDI. This finding already points to religious fundamentalism's being strongly dependent on one's situation. We presume that it is basically a reaction to socioeconomic conditions that threaten one's livelihood.

Comparison of the overall means (dashed lines) shows that an indifferent or somewhat disapproving attitude toward fundamentalist constructions of religiosity prevails in all the countries with an HDI greater than 0.80. This tendency is strongest in Switzerland, which is characterized not only by a very high HDI score (0.96) but also by a very stable consensus-oriented political culture. This results in a very high measure of existential security.

Figure 8: Mean scores for religious fundamentalism, by country



No values are available for Thailand

If we consider only the highly religious group, it becomes evident that Israel and South Korea represent outliers among the highly modernized countries. In both of these countries, highly religious individuals prefer a fundamentalist construction of religiosity. In South Korea, this is probably related to the large percentage of evangelicals within the Protestant spectrum. In Israel, this finding may be linked to the orthodoxy of most highly religious Jews. Both possible explanations indicate an independent and substantial role for the content of religiosity. Therefore, religious fundamentalism should be explained not only with exogenous factors but also on the basis of the endogenous attributes of a regional religious field.

The regression analysis models for religious fundamentalism confirm our interpretations of the trend lines for the mean scores (see Table 8). We should first point out the enormous amount of variance (33 %) that is explained by the exogenous variables. This is higher than it was for any of the other religious contents discussed in this chapter. We should also emphasize that the predictive power of the exogenous variables is twice as high as centrality's predictive power, which is only able to explain 15 percent of the variance. This does substantiate the thesis that endogenous dynamics play a relatively autonomous role in constituting fundamentalist religious attitudes, although situational factors are considerably more important. The diversity of the religious field and affiliation with a religious community explain only 3 percent of the variance for religious fundamentalism. The Abrahamic religions have the highest beta weights here, with Islam in particular harboring the strongest disposition toward a fundamentalist attitude. This finding is consistent with the "monotheism thesis" (Assmann 2007).

At the beginning of this section, we located the concepts of reflexivity, pluralism, and fundamentalism in the context of interreligious relationships and contacts. In terms of this overarching theme, several points can be emphasized by way of summary.

Indicators that express an open and tolerant attitude toward other religions find approval in all countries, regardless of centrality and the degree of modernization. Thus, on the level of attitudes, we can speak of a global consensus favoring religious pluralism. The findings on pluralistic religious practice, however, prove that syncretistic practice does not necessarily result from this. Attitudes toward syncretism tend toward indifference or disapproval. As suggested by the scores for fundamentalism (which are high in some countries), a tolerant attitude toward other religions is compatible with a fundamentalist understanding of one's own religiosity. Another argument for their mutual compatibility is the

weakness of the negative correlation between the two concepts that appears when centrality is held constant ($r_{partial} = -.17$, $N = 14.731$).

From these findings, we can conclude that there are many degrees of freedom for an individual to determine the relationship between religious tolerance and religious fundamentalism. Here, we should anticipate a variety of religious "Gestalten," which can be reconstructed through typological analysis (see Huber 2009b: 658–661). Further studies should investigate how these Gestalten of religiosity affect interreligious relationships. Finally, the Religion Monitor 2008 findings indicate that religious reflexivity is rather weak in the global religious field. A reflective religious style thus does not play a dominant role in shaping interreligious contacts and relationships.

Consequences for daily life

In this section, we explore the consequences of religiosity for daily life, singling out three areas: work, politics and exceptional situations. Work and politics can be characterized as public areas of life. "Exceptional situations," by contrast, refers more specifically to personal relationships and the biographical construction of the self grounded in them. The indicators' response scales again measure intensity. Their mean scores thus indicate whether religious contents are absent or present in these areas of life, whether moderately or clearly. Table 9 gives an overview of the results of the regression analysis models. These results are discussed in turn for each of the three areas of life.

Work and occupations

The trend line of the mean scores for the "work and occupations" area follows a pattern similar to that seen for religious fundamentalism. In less-modernized countries, religious contents are clearly present in working life. This goes for both highly religious and religious respondents. From the perspective of deprivation theory, this finding is explained by the fact that working conditions are often precarious in these countries and, consequently, offer numerous points of contact for religious strategies of interpretation and reassurance. One can additionally argue that functional differentiation has not progressed as far in these countries and that the autonomous logic of working life is accordingly less developed and less clearly represented in the individual consciousness.

Table 9: Regression analysis models for the consequences of religiosity for daily life

	Dependent variables								
	Work			Politics			Exceptional situations		
Model	Adjusted R^2								
M 1	.28			.06			.18		
M 2	.45 (ΔR^2 = .17)			.16 (ΔR^2 = .10)			.48 (ΔR^2 = .30)		
M 3	.47 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.19 (ΔR^2 = .03)			.50 (ΔR^2 = .02)		
Independent variables	Standardized beta coefficient								
	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	M 2	M 3
Age	.07	.01	.02	.08	.03	.03	.07	*–.01*	*–.01*
Gender	.04	*.01*	*.01*	–.02	–.05	–.04	.09	.04	.04
Education	*.01*	*.01*	*.01*	.05	.05	.05	–.03	–.03	–.03
HDI	–.44	–.33	–.22	–.14	–.05	.05	–.34	–.18	–.10
Gini coefficient	.17	.04	.07	.16	.06	.10	.14	–.03	*–.01*
Centrality		.46	.45		.34	.35		.62	.59
Diversity			.03			.13			*–.01*
Christianity			.06			*.02*			.16
Judaism			.02			.03			.04
Islam			.22			.18			.15
Hinduism			.13			.15			.12
Buddhism			.09			.12			.14

Note: non-significant coefficients ($p > .05$) are italicized

One exception to this rule is Turkey. Its overall mean is in the mid-range of the scale, which suggests that religious contents are present only in the background of working life. This unusual finding can be explained by the strong influence of secularist positions on Turkish politics. As a result, religious symbols (e.g., the hijab) are highly controversial in the public sphere. Since a secularist political movement can be interpreted as being an actor in the religious field, the special case of Turkey is at the same time a good example of endogenous religious dynamics producing clear effects.

In the highly modernized countries, religious contents are, on average, not relevant to perceptions of working life. In a few countries (Poland, Italy, the United States, and South Korea) a weak average background relevance can be

Figure 9: Mean scores for the consequences of religiosity for "work and occupations," by country



measured, which points to highly advanced processes of functional differentiation. In view of this general tendency, the mean scores for the highly religious group in these countries are especially notable. Apart from one exception, they linger on the threshold between background presence and clear presence—an indication that countertendencies in the life horizon of highly religious people are working against the general tendency toward functional differentiation. Another thing arguing for this is their relatively great distance from the religious group, whose religious constructions are much more strongly determined by general social structures and dynamics.

Highly religious individuals in Russia represent one exception. Religious contents have no relevance for them in their working lives. Owing to our inability to compare Russia with other countries shaped by Orthodox Christianity, we cannot be sure if this finding is a result of the long atheistic phase in Russian social life or if it is due to special characteristics of the Orthodox construction of public life. However, this finding is considerably more striking for the highly religious than it is for the religious group, and this argues for an endogenous religious dynamic rooted in the tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of the defining characteristics of highly religious people is that the internal logic of their religion is more likely to exert effects on them than on religious people.

Another noteworthy finding is the large difference between the mean scores for the highly religious and the religious groups in Spain. While religious contents tend to be clearly present in the first group's perception of working life,

they play no role for the second group. This indicates strong social polarization regarding the role of religion in public places. The large difference between these two groups in respect to religious self-concept also argues for this interpretation (see Figure 3). Since the Catholic Church has been a monopolistic actor in Spain's religious field for centuries, this polarization may be integrally related to its policies.

These interpretations of the trends in the mean scores are verified by the regression analysis results (see Table 9). After religious fundamentalism, the religiously connoted perception of working life is the most dependent on exogenous variables, which explain 28 percent of the variance. This is considerably greater than the amount of variance explained by centrality (17 %) and other endogenous religious factors (2 %). The religious communities with the highest beta weights are Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Since these religious communities were surveyed almost exclusively in countries with a low level of modernization, these values may conceal interactions between the level of modernization and the religious production of meaning.

Politics

The findings on the subjectively perceived relevance of religiosity for political opinions provide evidence that religious contents do not have uniform effects on different areas of life (Figure 10). These findings stand in sharp contrast to those for "work and occupations," which, like politics, can be allocated to the public sphere, as well as for "exceptional situations," which more strongly represent private life contexts.

Apart from the special case of the United States, the mean scores for the highly religious group are very similar. They fall in the middle or lower range of the scale and show that as a rule, religious contents have only background relevance for the political opinions of this group. Since the mean scores for the highly religious respondents are in part significantly higher for the other two areas of daily life, this result expresses a tendency to distance themselves from politics. It is possible that this group has a strong tendency to understand political affairs as a "foreign element" to religiosity. If this interpretation holds true, then the fundamentalism scores for the highly religious respondents—some of which are very high—relate more to their inner construction of religiosity and less to a political orientation of religiosity. This problem, however requires more in-depth analysis.

Figure 10: Means scores for the consequences of religiosity for one's "own political opinions," by country



Mean scores are striking low for the highly religious group in Poland, Guatemala, and Morocco. In Guatemala, this especially strong dissociation from politics may be due to people's experiences in the civil war that ended just a few years ago. Denominational and theological antagonisms played a significant role in this war, which claimed tens of thousands of victims. In Poland and Morocco, the responses may express alienation from the political claims to power of both the Catholic Church and Islamist groups.

India is the only country in which the religious group achieved a higher mean score than the highly religious group did. This result can be interpreted in the context of Hindu nationalist discourses and the strengthening of Hindu nationalist parties in recent decades. Accordingly, the social basis for these movements in India should be sought mainly in the religious group. In contrast, the highly religious group tends to be critical toward Hindu nationalist tendencies. India's general pattern of highly religious individuals being alienated from politics is emphasized especially strongly in this regard.

The highly religious group in the United States is a special case. Only in one country is the mean score so high that one can speak of religiosity as clearly influencing political opinions. The scores are even considerably higher than they are in Nigeria, which leads the field of 21 countries in most of the religious contents. The United States is thus the country in which religiously justified politics has the greatest chance of success. This finding corresponds with the increasing influence that the evangelical churches have exerted on politics in the United

States since the 1970s. The highly religious group in the United States thus represents an impressive counterexample to the general tendency of religious people to distance themselves from politics. To a significant degree, this speaks for the variability of the construction of religiosity.

It is not surprising that the non-religious group consistently distances itself from attributing political relevance for religiosity. This also goes for the religious group in most countries. The exceptions to this are some of the countries with a low degree of modernization (e.g., Turkey, Indonesia, India and Thailand). But even in these countries, the mean scores remain in the mid-range of the scale, which signals mere background relevance. In sum, we can conclude that the subjectively perceived political influence of religiosity is rather low.

The regression analysis results also suggest that the political sphere should be accorded an exceptional position in the construction of the relevance of religiosity in daily life. Exogenous factors explain only 6 percent of the variance. Compared to the 28 percent for "work and occupations," this is much lower—amounting to a little less than a quarter. The amount of variance explained by centrality is also lower than for "work and occupations," but the decline is smaller: 17 percent versus 10 percent. Thus, the relative weight of centrality is greater, as it explains more variance than the exogenous variables. Since the other endogenous variables in the third model explain an additional 3 percent of the variance, the endogenous variables clearly outweigh the exogenous variables (13 % versus 6 %). These findings indicate that substantially more degrees of freedom exist in the individual construction of the political relevance of religiosity than in the construction of working life, which also belongs to the public sphere.

The large number of degrees of freedom is also reflected in the fact that many individual factors play a meaningful role in the third regression analysis model. This means that there is a multitude of relevant points of contact for the religious production of meaning, which can be differently weighted and coordinated by the individual.

The exogenous variables with the greatest weight are educational level (beta = .05), degree of modernization (beta = .05), and degree of social inequality (beta = .10). It is notable that the HDI, which represents the degree of modernization, has a positive beta. As a rule, modernity correlates negatively with religious variables. However, this is not the case for either the political relevance of religiosity or a pluralist religious attitude. The comparatively high weight for the Gini coefficients is not a surprise: As social inequality increases, so do the points of contact for judging a country's political situation in political terms.

The centrality scale has the largest beta weight (.35). This finding, too, is not surprising, since with increasing centrality there is a greater general tendency for individual life horizons to be permeated with religious semantics (see Huber 2009a: 36). However, the relatively high weight for religious diversity (beta = .13) calls for more in-depth studies. Along with religious reflexivity (beta = .10), this is the strongest correlation between the diversity of a country's religious field and the strength of a religious content. This finding suggests that politicization increases along with religious diversity, and that the relationship between religiosity and politics is linked to issues of the power, representation, and participation of various religious communities in the national context.

The religious communities with the highest beta weights are Islam (.18), Hinduism (.15), and Buddhism (.12). This is similar to the findings for the area of "work and occupations." Here, too, it is possible that these scores conceal interactions between the level of modernization and the religious production of meaning in these countries.

In closing, we should emphasis that our discussion of the political relevance of religiosity is based on respondents' subjective perceptions. One cannot seamlessly extrapolate from this to objective interrelationships. For this reason, the findings discussed here are in strong need of being fleshed out.

Exceptional situations

Under the rubric of "exceptional situations," we include religiosity's impact on dealing with crises, illness, questions about the meaning of life and important family events. Responses to these four indicators are combined into a scale formed by adding the scores and dividing them by four. The resulting scale exhibits very high internal consistency, with an alpha coefficient of .92. One substantive similarity of these situations is that they are especially likely to inspire reflection on biographical contingencies—whether experienced negatively or positively. This topic brings into view a discussion that postulates religious themes in which coping with contingency is "resistant to the Enlightenment and secularization" (cf., e.g., Lübbe 2004).

Once again, the trend line for the mean scores shows a new pattern. We should give special emphasis to the enormous uniformity and very high scores for the highly religious group. Apart from a "pluralistic religious attitude" (see Figure 6)—which is an exceptional concept in general—a similar trend is seen only for religious self-concept and the general relevance of religious command-

Figure 11: Mean scores for the consequences of religiosity for "exceptional situations," by country



ments in daily life. Both attributes arise from the concept of being highly religious. This indicates that religious reflection on and interpretation of exceptional situations is also an intrinsic attribute of being highly religious. Neither exogenous factors nor affiliation with a particular religious community exerts a differentiating influence on this group.

A second clear pattern can be observed in the roughly equal distances between the three levels of centrality among the more highly modernized countries. This finding shows that in these countries, whether one draws on religious content in exceptional situations depends mainly on the centrality of religiosity. The mean scores are so low for the non-religious group that we can assume that they do not draw on religious contents even in exceptional situations. This challenges the general validity of the thesis that certain religious ways of coping with contingency are resistant to secularization.

Among the less modernized countries, it is striking that even the religious group is very highly disposed to falling back on religious interpretations when experiencing contingency in their lives. We suspect that this is connected to the diminished availability of non-religious forms of coping with contingency. In addition, the existential stresses that arise in exceptional situations are likely to be much more severe than they are in more highly modernized countries. This, too, can encourage people to turn toward religious interpretive schemes.

The regression analysis results confirm this clear pattern in the trend for the means. Endogenous factors explain nearly twice as much variance as exogenous

ones (32 % versus 18 %). Most of this can be traced back to centrality, which by itself explains 30 percent of the variance. Among the exogenous factors, HDI has the most weight, which points out the seriousness of stresses in exceptional situations and the importance of the availability of alternative forms of coping.

In this section on the consequences of religiosity for daily life, we have discussed the findings for three areas: "work and occupations," "politics" and "exceptional situations." It has become clear that religious beliefs do not uniformly affect daily life; instead, the strength of their presence varies from one area to another. The highest mean scores can be observed for "exceptional situations." The most striking result for this area of life is the uniform trend of the means for the highly religious group across all countries, levels of modernizations, and religions. From this finding, we can conclude that religious construction of the private context of one's life is an intrinsic attribute of being highly religious.

With respect to the public sphere, two different patterns have emerged. In some places, the area of "work and occupations" is very strongly permeated by religious semantics—probably due to religiously based ethical orientations. On this matter, the psychological concept of centrality and the sociological perspective of the degree of modernization have proved to be the most important explanatory factors. Religious contents have been seen to be considerably less relevant for political opinions. This indicates that most individuals clearly separate religion and politics in their religious consciousness. The findings from the United States represent an exception to this. Overall, the diversity of the findings for the relevance of religiosity in different areas of life reveals the need for nuanced measurements of religiosity.

Religious emotions

Our final content-related concept is the emotional valence of religiosity. This brings us to the dimension of religious experience. The Religion Monitor inquired about the frequency of 15 religious emotions. Factor analysis shows that, with a few exceptions, this inventory divides into two factors wherever a positive or negative psychological valence is expressed. The positive factor comprises nine emotions: hope, love, joy, help, gratitude, strength, protection, justice, and awe. The negative factor is loaded with four main emotions: rage, desperation, anxiety and guilt. In the following discussion, we do not go into individual emotions. Instead, we refer to these two factors from which highly reliable scales can be constructed. In this

way, we abstract from the various facets of theology that are expressed in the individual religious emotions. Our focus is solely on their psychological valences.

Positive emotions

The trend of the mean scores for positive religious emotions strongly resembles the patterns that were observable for the meaning of religiosity in exceptional situations. Once again, the trend for highly religious respondents stands out as being extremely uniform in the upper range of the intensity scale. This indicates

Table 10: Regression analysis models for positive and negative religious emotions

	Dependent variables					
	Positive religious emotions			Negative religious emotions		
Models	Adjusted R^2					
M 1	.24			.20		
M 2	.60 (ΔR^2 = .36)			.30 (ΔR^2 = .10)		
M 3	.62 (ΔR^2 = .02)			.32 (ΔR^2 = .01)		
Independent variables	Standardized beta coefficient					
	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 1	2	M 3
Age	.08	*–.01*	*–.00*	*–.01*	–.06	–.06
Gender	.10	.05	.05	.06	.03	.03
Education	–.05	–.04	–.04	–.06	–.06	–.06
HDI	–.38	–.20	–.08	–.38	–.28	–.20
Gini coefficient	.18	*–.00*	.04	.10	*.00*	.04
Centrality		.67	.63		.36	.32
Diversity			–.06			.03
Christianity			.16			.16
Judaism			.06			.05
Islam			.23			.18
Hinduism			.15			.15
Buddhism			.10			.12

Note: non-significant coefficients ($p > .05$) are italicized

that relying on religious semantics to cope with exceptional situations proves valuable for this group. Thus, religiosity represents a substantial psychological resource for them. The uniformity of the trend further supports the idea that highly religious individuals draw great emotional benefits from their religiosity, independent of their country's level of modernization and the religious traditions that have influenced them.

In the more highly modernized countries, the positive emotional valence of religiosity diminishes markedly among the religious group, with scores hovering in the mid-range of the scale. Positive religious emotions represent only a background phenomenon for them. Therefore, they may not perceive religious contents as a central psychological resource. In contrast, the positive emotional valence rises considerably among religious respondents in less-modernized countries, almost reaching the level of the highly religious group. This pattern is also consistent with our findings on coping with exceptional situations, which indicates that, even among the religious group, religiosity can become a substantial psychological resource. However, this possibility depends strongly on their country's degree of modernization and, thus, probably also on the scope of existential stresses and the availability of alternative forms of coping.

In view of the similar patterns in Figure 11 and Figure 12, it is not surprising that major similarities also appear between the regression analysis findings for both concepts. Endogenous factors—especially centrality—once again have a considerably greater explanatory potential. The main difference is that the amount of explained variance is even greater, and that goes for both exogenous and

Figure 12: Mean scores for religious emotions with a positive psychological valence, by country



endogenous factors. Moreover, compared to the 11 content-related concepts that we discuss in this chapter, the total explained variance is greatest here, at 62 percent (Model 3). This indicates that religiosity almost "inevitably" has a positive emotional valence as a function of these factors.

Another difference from the exceptional situations construct appears in relation to Islam. As the relatively high beta weight of .22 suggests, Islam leads to a more positive emotional valence than other religious communities do, which should also result in a clearer perception of the character of religion as a resource.

Finally, we should point out that when comparing the 11 concepts, the factor of gender exerts the greatest influence on positive religious emotions (beta = .05). Regardless of the centrality of religiosity and the other influencing factors studied, women have more positive religious feelings than men do.

Negative emotions

The mean scores for negative religious emotions are in part substantially lower than for the positive emotions. This difference is especially great for the highly religious group. The "emotional balance sheet" of this group is thus much more favorable than it is for the other two groups, which provides further evidence that religiosity represents an especially powerful psychological resource for highly religious individuals. A second difference from the positive religious emotions is that the gap between the religious and highly religious groups is small

Figure 13: Mean scores for religious emotions with a negative psychological valence, by country



even in countries with a high level of modernization. Centrality thus plays a substantially smaller role in comparison to the other religious contents.

The regression analysis results substantiate the relatively weak explanatory potential of centrality. It is only half as large as that of the exogenous variables in Model 1. This means that negative religious emotions depend mainly on situational factors. Conditions within the social structure have more influence than the internal dynamics of religion studied here. For this reason as well, the total explanatory potential expressed in Model 3 is only half as large as for the positive religious emotions.

In discussing these findings, we have concentrated on the question of how strongly religiosity can be considered a psychological resource. We assume here that religious emotions with a positive valence represent a psychological resource, while negative valences are perceived as a burden. Our findings show that the positive valences outweigh the negative. This indicates that religiosity functions as a substantial psychological resource. This character is especially pronounced within the highly religious group. Future studies should explore this topic in greater depth.

Summary

As suggested at the outset of this chapter, the findings and analyses discussed here are preliminary and should therefore be understood as being prototypes for more detailed transnational studies. Their limited significance is primarily due to the following circumstances:

- The countries represent a selection that should be quantitatively expanded and qualitatively differentiated. The country-oriented indicators—the HDI and Gini coefficients as exogenous variables and the index of religious diversity as an endogenous variable—must be supplemented in order to capture the particular conditions of the religious field in each country. For instance, we are thinking of indicators for each country that would reflect the political and legal situation of religion, the influence of religious organizations as actors in civil society, and the presence of religious topics in the media.
- In addition, we must differentiate more finely within the individual religious communities in order to do justice to the diversity and denominational differences within religions. This goes especially for Islam and Buddhism, but also for Christianity, whose Orthodox and Protestant spectrum must be considered more closely. For all of the religions mentioned, a sample larger than

was used in the Religion Monitor is needed in order to reach generalizable conclusions.

- In addition, the entire model should be further elaborated so as to include additional factors that are both external and internal to religion, as well as additional religious concepts as *tertia comparationis*. Moreover, methodological questions have arisen in regard to measuring religious diversity. For example, it would be necessary to develop a more sophisticated diversity index that is capable of identifying various constellations and patterns of religious diversity. The present index of religious diversity has worked in conformance with theory in a number of cases. Nevertheless, the overall lack of empirical evidence may be linked to methodological problems in operationalization and measurement.
- Furthermore, path analyses would be necessary in order to more precisely determine how individual factors function. This would primarily help us deepen our knowledge of the interrelationships between endogenous and exogenous factors. Since the functionality of individual factors can change greatly in countries with different degrees of modernization and historical religious traditions, path analyses that encompass the global religious field should be supplemented by studies of individual countries and groups of countries. However, researchers working individually cannot deal with such complex and intricate questions. This would require research teams equipped with adequate resources of time and money.
- Finally, analytical perspectives from the sociology and psychology of religion must be supplemented by deriving potential endogenous factors from the history of religion. To this end, comprehensive basic research in comparative philology and history is essential. The various beliefs and practices connected to the notions of religions and religiosity, along with their cultural embeddedness, can only be understood in terms of a *longue durée* perspective that is informed by cultural history.

Nonetheless, we can still draw the following conclusions:

- As Figure 14 illustrates, the explanatory potential of the three models varies greatly, from about 4 percent (for a pluralistic religious attitude) to about 60 percent (for a positive emotional valence). On the one hand, this could mean that we need to keep working on the complexity of the models. On the other hand, this variation may also indicate different degrees of freedom for the production and reception of religious meaning. By no means must religious globalization only involve the leveling of religious beliefs, experiences, and practices, as well as their preconditions and consequences. It is equally possi-

Figure 14: Explained variance (adjusted R^2) of the three regression analysis models for 12 religiosity variables



ble for religiosity to be transformed, reinterpreted, or re-traditionalized in various ways under globalized conditions.

- The findings also show that the influence of exogenous and endogenous factors on religious structures and dynamics is not fixed but varies according to the content. Exogenous variables are especially relevant for three of the religious concepts studied: fundamentalism, the influence of religiosity on work and occupations, and negative religious emotions. Centrality plays the main role for five religious concepts: reflexivity, positive religious emotions, the influence of religiosity on political opinions, exceptional situations and the general relevance of religiosity for daily life. For the cognitive and practical aspects of religious pluralism, the religious communities are responsible for most of the explained variance. These findings, too, make plain that quite different constellations are at work in the religious field and point to the degrees of freedom in religious meanings.

- Overall, in the relation between factors endogenous and exogenous to religiosity, the endogenous factors outweigh exogenous factors by a ratio of 7 to 3. Of course, this finding depends on which religious concepts were selected and, consequently, should not necessarily be generalized. Even so, it indicates that endogenous factors have been unjustly neglected in previous research on religion.
- With respect to general social-structural indicators, a country's level of modernization has proven to be the most important exogenous factor in explaining the religious contents discussed here. Among the endogenous factors, centrality is by far the strongest. The finding that affiliation with a religious community so dramatically trails the centrality factor is an argument against block thinking in general and Huntington's thesis in particular. The relationship between centrality and the degree of modernization should be more closely examined in follow-up studies.
- On the overarching question of the structures and dynamics of the religious field on a global scale, the overall very large amount of variance explained by centrality may indicate that one characteristic of the current global religious field is that it places general religiosity in the foreground compared to actual religions and concrete religiosity. Where religious beliefs, experiences and practices defined by their content come to the fore, however, this may be understood as being a countermovement against the tendency toward leveling content in the global religious field. This circumstance is consistent with the general research on globalization, which emphasizes the dialectical relationship between globalization and regionalization, standardization and deviation.

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